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»ABSTRACT
We present a model in which intertemporal interdependencies and
divergence of time preferences alter the form of optimal contracts
between a risk-neutral agent and risk-neutral principals. The agent
wishes to maximize the discounted sum of benefits over his or her
lifetime; the principals each want to maximize only current rewards.
We demonstrate the existence of conditions under which all principals
(except the last period's) can be made strictly better off by allowing
the agent to capture some surplus each period (via an incentive
contract) , instead of forcing the agent down to the reservation wage
with a fixed-payment contract. The incentive contracts serve as a
means of aligning the time preferences of the agent and the principals
t
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II. INTRODUCTION
Much of the principal-agent literature in economics, finance and
accounting deals with the structure of contracts under a variety of
assxomptions about risk preferences and the availability of information.
These papers usually abstain from institutional constraints. For
example, if both the principal and the agent are risk-neutral and
contract for one period, and one period only, it is well-known that the
Pareto optimal contract has the principal "selling" the output to the
agent for a fixed fee; in this way, the principal is able to recapture
all of the rents the agent could have earned because of asymmetries of
information. (See, for example, Shavell [1979].) Why is it that we
don't see these property rights being sold more often in the real
world, when we can safely assume risk-neutrality of the agent?
Sappington [1983] suggests that the agent's limited liability prevents
such contracts. Here we provide an alternative explanation. Our
explanation is that the agent serves a series of interdependent
principals over his or her professional career. In our framework, the
time horizons of the principals and the agent are not indentical,
adding a new source of "preference divergence." These
interdependencies and non-alignment of time preferences change the form
of the contracts that we would expect between the agent and the
principals
.
If the agent and the principals are myopic (current reward)
maximizers and risk-neutral, then the optimal contract between the
agent and each principal would have the principal selling the outcome
to the agent for a fixed payment; in this way, the principal would
capture all of the surplus from the agent. If, however, the agent is
interested in maximizing the discounted sum of payments over a finite
working lifetime, and the principal in each period wants to maximize
only current reward, then are the optimal contracts still fixed-payment
contracts? Intuition would tell us that if the outcomes are
independent, in that the actions taken by the agent on behalf of one
principal have no effect on subsequent principals' payoffs, then myopic
maximization is still optimal. When the payoffs are not independent,
however, myopic contracting may not be optimal from either the agent's
or from the principals' points of view, or both.
The way in which we introduce interdependencies between
principals' payoffs, and thus intertemporal links, is by assuming that
rewards in future periods depend upon current states and future states.
In particular, we assume that one of two possible states can occur each
period. Label these "win" or "lose". Associated with each state is a
reward function which depends upon past states , via a summary variable
of past history. We call this variable "reputation". The principal in
each period holds "title" to the reward in that period. Each agent is
endowed with an initial amount of reputation when the process starts.
We also assume that rewards are increasing in reputation.
It should be noted that the reputation variable we define is not
reputation in the sense of, for example, Kreps and Wilson [1982]. In
those models, the agent's type, which remains the same over time, is
not known to the principal and reputation serves as a signal about the
agent's unknown type.-^ In our model, reputation can be thought of as
the agent's type and we assume that this information is known with
certainty by the principal. The distinguishing feature of our model is
that the agent's type changes stochastically over time as a function of
states that occurred in past periods. The agent can control this
stochastic process by providing effort that effects the probability of
the states. Effort is assumed to increase (decrease) the probability
of winning (losing) in the current period.
Intertemporal interdependencies create a new source of divergence
of preferences if the time horizons of the principals and the agent are
not the same. We assume that the agent wishes to maximize a discounted
stream of rewards over his or her lifetime. The principals, however,
wish to maximize only their own current reward, since their
relationship with the agent lasts for only one period. The structure
of the model is such that if the win state occurs in the current
period, the agent is strictly better off next period, ceteris paribus,
than if the lose state occurs in the current period. There are, thus,
future as well as current rents that can accrue to the agent from
increased effort. The contracts that the principals offer to the agent
should be designed to capture as much of these total rents as possible.
The total rents in any period depend on past history through the
reputation variable. In any period, a principal chooses a contract to
offer the agent. The agent then chooses a level of effort that
maximizes expected discounted rewards from the current period to the
end of the planning horizon. The model we consider in this paper is
one in which there are two periods. Our results would, however, hold
for any finite number of periods. Suppose that at the last period the
risk-neutral principal offers the agent a contract that captures all
the rents of that last period for the principal and forces the agent
down to his or her reservation utility. In such a contract the agent
pays the principal a fixed amount equal to the maximum expected total
surplus. If this type of contract is used in the last period, then the
agent can not capture any expected rents from winning in the first
period. That is, the agent's expected reward in the final period is
independent of the state that occurs in the first period. Thus, in
terms of last period rewards, the agent is indifferent between winning
and losing in the first period. The optimal contract in the first
period is then (again) a fixed price contract in which the agent pays
the principal the maximum expected total surplus in the first period.
In contrast, if the principal in the last period offers the agent
an incentive contract that allows the agent to keep some expected
surplus, and more importantly such that the amount of surplus that the
agent keeps depends upon what happened in the first period, then the
agent is not indifferent between winning and losing in the first period
in terms of the effect on final period utility. Clearly, the agent is
strictly better off ex ante with contracts each period which guarantee
an expected payment strictly more than the reservation utility each
period, rather than contracts each period that guarantee exactly the
reservation wage in each period. Can the principals be made better off
as well?
Our results show that (1) the last period principal is always
worse off; (2) conditions exist such that the principals in all but the
last period are strictly better off; and (3) conditions exist such that
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the total expected discounted surplus from the beginning of the
planning horizon is strictly greater with incentive contracts.
The implications of (1) and (2) above is that there is an implicit
intertemporal transfer from the last period principal to earlier
principals. The difficulty with using (3) to claim Pareto superiority
for incentive contracts is that we must be able to transfer surplus
from one period to another and from one principal to another. However,
since the principals are different each period, such a transfer becomes
problematic.
The intuition behind our results is that the incentive contract
may be better able to align the time preferences of the principals (in
all but the last period) and the agent. In the final period, by
definition the asymmetry in time preferences no longer exists between
the principal and the agent; in that case the fixed-payment contract is
always better for the principal. In contrast (in all but the final
period) with an incentive contract the reward for winning is the
current reward plus the discounted net increase in the surplus in the
future; with a fixed-payment contract, the only reward for winning is
the current reward. Thus, with the incentive contract the agent
provides more effort (which is costly to the agent) and this increased
effort increases the probability of winning; the effect of the latter
on expected rewards more than compensates for the increase in costs to
the agent.
Consider our model in the context of the relationship between a
lawyer (the agent) and the many clients (principals) that the lawyer
serves orver his or her professinal career. We can use our results to
explain, at least in part, the absence of contracts in which the lawyer
"buys" a case from the client.
If we think of lawyers as a group with bargaining power, we can
conclude that they may have the ability to control the types of
contracts the members of the group may ethically and legallly accept.
Clearly, incentive contracts benefit the lawyers at the expense of some
of the clients. Why then would legislators be willing to pass laws
prohibiting lawyers from buying cases from clients? Our results show
that all the clients, except the final one, may be made strictly better
off with incentive contracts. If the legislators themselves have a
short time perspective, the final client's welfare will be greatly
discounted in any computation of benefits versus costs. In addition,
the legislators can also claim, as a result of (3) above, that since
the total surplus can be greater with incentive contracts, society as a
whole is somehow "better off" - ignoring^, of course, the fact that some
members of society are strictly worse off as individuals.
We further demonstrate that as the net future benefit of winning
increases, the agent's share of current reward decreases and the
principal's share of current reward increases. This result may
explain, for example, why lawyers are willing to do pro bono work in
potentially landmark cases: lawyers take "payment" in the future from
increased reputation.
III. THE MODEL
In this section we develop the formal model we use to obtain our
results. For ease of exposition, we will restrict our attention to
the two period case; however, as stated in the introduction, our
results hold for any finite number of periods.
At the beginning of each period, the agent is endowed with some
level of reputation, which we denote by r and r]_, where r denotes
reputation at the beginning of the planning horizon when there are two
periods to go and r]_ denotes the reputation at the beginning of the
last period in the planning horizon. We describe below the precise
relationship between r and r]_. The current level of reputation is
known by both the agent and the current period's principal.
The model we consider is a two-state model. For ease of
exposition, we call these states "win" and "lose". At the beginning
of the planning horizon, the agent's reputation is given. If the win
state occurs, then ri = ry(r) ; if the lose state occurs, then r]^ =
rL(r) , where ry > and rL > . The relationship between these
functions is as follows: for all r,
ry(r) > r; r^Cr) > rL(r)
.
(2.1)
Winning improves reputation over the previous period, and winning is
better than losing. However, losing may or may not improve
reputation.
If the lose state occurs in the current period, the current
reward is defined (without loss of generality) to be equal to zero,
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If the win state occurs, the reward in the current period is a
function of the beginning of the period reputation. We denote this
reward function by X(
• ) . where X' > and X'' < 0. Reward in the
first (last) period is then given by X(r) (X(r]^)). Since r]_ depends
on whether the win or lose state occurs in the first period and on r,
X(
•
) in the final period depends upon initial reputation and the
outcome in the first period. Given the relationship described in
(2.1) above, we have
X(rw(r)) > X(r); X(rw(r)) > X(rL(r)). (2.2)
Current reward is increasing in both initial reputation r and the
outcome in the previous period.
The X(
•
) function can be interpreted in the following way: in the
the lawyer's case, X(
•
) would represent the size of the cash award the
lawyer can get for the client (if the case is won). If the lawyer has
a high level of reputation, perhaps from winning several past cases,
the lawyer will be in a better negotiating position with opposing
lawyers with inferior track records, thus increasing the potential
jury or out of court settlement award to the client.
The probability that the win state occurs in any period is
denoted by p(a) and the probability of the lose state by (1 - p(a)),
where a is the level of "effort" taken by the agent in the current
period. These probabilities depend only on the current level of
effort, and are independent of the agent's reputation as well.^
Feasible effort levels are contained in the interval [0,a], where a is
*
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not necessarily finite. The p(a) function satisfies the following
assumptions
:
P(0) = 0;
p'(a) >
,
p"(a) < 0, and p"'(a) > for all a e [0,a]; (2.3)
lim p(a) < 1.
a->'a
The last assumption in (2.3) implies that even if the agent were to
take the maximum level of effort that is feasible, there still may be
some residual uncertainty remaining; the agent may not have the
ability to make the win state a sure thing. The assumption on the
third derivative of p(a) is necessary to obtain our results. This
assumption states that p(a) is a very smooth increasing, concave
function of a.
To demonstrate the existence of sufficent conditions for
incentive contracts that allow the agent to keep some of the rents
each period to be superior to fixed-payment contracts (for all but the
final principal) when both the agent and the principal are' risk-
neutral, we restrict attention to linear sharing rules . -^ If
sufficient conditions exist under which linear sharing rules are
superior, then conditions must exist for general optimal incentive
contracts to dominate fixed-payment contracts. Clearly, this
restriction simplifies the analysis considerably. Define K as the
fraction of current reward kept by the agent; (1 - K) is the fraction
that goes to the principal.
We assume that the agent's disutility from effort has a monetary
10
equivalent expressed by the function g(a) , which satisfies the
following:
g(0) = 0;
g'(a) > 0, g''(a) >, and g' ' ' (a) > for all a e [0,q]; and
lim g(a) = 00.
a-*a
These conditions require g(a) to be a very smooth, increasing, convex
function of a; in addition, disutility of effort goes to infinity as a
goes to its upper limit. The requirements on the p(a) and g(a)
functions assure that the problem we model has a non- trivial solution:
that is, a = Q is not a feasible level of effort. To assure that
a = is not a feasible solution we require p'(0)X(r) - g' (0) > 0;
that is, there is a positive net marginal benefit of increasing effort
above zero
.
In the tradition of dynamic programming, we use backward
induction arguments to demonstrate our results. At the beginning of
the last period, the agent's reputation, r^^, is given and known to the
agent and the current principal. For a given contract K, the agent
will solve the following maximization problem:
MAX p(a)KX(ri) - g(a)
.
(2.5)
a
Without loss of generality, we assume that the agent's reservation
wage is zero. Given our assumptions on p(*) and g(
• ) > ^e know that
the following first order condition is both necessary and sufficient
11
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for the solution to the problem in (2.5):
p'(a)KX(ri) - g'(a) = 0. (2.6)
The principal wishes to choose a share K and an effort level a to
solve.
MAX p(a)(l - K)X(ri)
K,a
(2.7)
s.t. p'(a)KX(ri) - g' (a) = 0; (incentive compatibility)
p(a)KX(r]_) - g(a) > 0. (individual rationality)
It is immediate that K < is not a feasible solution; since g' (a) >
and p'(a) > 0, there would not be any a satisfying the first
constraint. The incentive compatibility constraint is satisfied with
equality since the principal would never choose a K such that the
agent would be induced to choose a = 0; the principal would be
strictly better off with a "small" K that induces a "small" amount of
effort a > 0. Such a (K,a) pair exists because p'(0)X(r) - g' (0) > 0.
To simplify the analysis, we give a sufficient condition such
that the individual rationality constraint is satisfied by any (K,a)
pair that satisfies the incentive compatibility constraint:
g(a)/p(a) is non-decreasing in a for all a e [0,a]. (2.8)
Since g(a) is convex increasing and p(a) is concave increasing, this
assumption can be interpreted as g(a) increases at least as fast as
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p(a) . We can state:
PROPOSITION 2.1
If g(a)/p(a) is non- decreasing in a for all a e [0,a], then the
individual rationality constraint in (2.7) is redundant.
(All proofs are contained in the Appendix)
.
From the agent's first order condition we can express K as a
function of a. We can thus rewrite the principal's problem as the
selection of a (and implicitly K) to solve the unconstrained
maximization problem^
g'(a)
MAX p(a)X(ri) - p(a) . (2.9)
a p'(a)
Let 3.i(ri) solve (2.9). Then the principal's and the agent's expected
rewards can be written, respectively, as
g'(ai(ri))
Ui(ri) - p(ai(ri))X(ri) - p(ai(ri)) .
P'(ai(ri))
and (2.10)
g'(ai(ri))
Vl(ri) s p(ai(ri)) - g(ai(ri)).
P'(ai(ri))
Note that
Ui(ri) + Vi(ri) = p(ai(ri))X(ri) - g(ai(ri)), (2.11)
13
Iwhich is the total surplus to be divided between the principal and the
agent in the final period.
When the contract between the agent and the principal is a fixed-
payment contract, the agent buys the reward from the principal for a
payment P(r]_)
,
where
P(ri) - MAX p(a)X(ri) - g(a)
a
The principal's expected utility is then
Uj(ri) = P(ri), (2.12)
and the agent's expected utility is the reservation wage (assumed here
to be zero). Since uj(rx) + vj(rx) > Ui(ri) + Vx(ri) and V]_(ri) >
V]_(r]_), we have U]_(r]^) > U]^(r]_), the expected result that the
principal is no worse off with the fixed-payment contract and the
agent is no worse off with the incentive contract.
The principals in our model are concerned only with the current
period's reward. The agent, however, wishes to maximize the
discounted sum of rewards over his or her "lifetime". The agent's
reward in the final period depends on the agent's reputation at the
beginning of the final period, which in turn depends on the agent's
initial level of reputation and the state that occurs in the first
period. For ease of notation, we make the following definitions:
Viw(r) - Vi(riw(r)) and V^lCt) = Vi(riL(r) ) . (2.13)
14
At the beginning of the planning horizon, the agent faces the
first principal. For a given contract K, the agent wishes to choose
the level of effort a to mazimize the discounted sum of rewards over
the two periods, where /3 < 1 is the discount rate. Thus, the agent
wishes to solve:
MAX p(a)KX(r) - g(a) + ^[p(a)Viw(r) + (l-p(a)) V;LL(r)]- (2-1^)
a
Under our assumptions on p(a) and g(a) , the following first order
condition is again both necessary and sufficient:
p'(a)KX(r) - g'(a) + ^p' (a) [Viy(r) - V^lCt)] = 0. (2.15)
The principal wishes to choose a and K to solve:
MAX p(a)(l - K)X(r)
a
s.t. p'(a)[KX(r) + /3(Viy(r) - ViL(r))] - g' (a) = 0; (2.16)
p(a)KX(r) - g(a) + ^[p(a)Viy(r) + (l-p(a) )ViL(r) ] > 0.
Under the assumption in (2.8), we have the following Proposition,
which is the first period analog of Proposition 2.1:
PROPOSITION 1.1
If g(a)/p(a) is non-decreasing in a for all a € [0,a], then the
individual rationality constraint in (2.16) is redundant.
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The principal's problem can again be reduced to finding a
solution to an unconstrained maximization problem:
g'(a)
MAX p(a)X(r) - p(a) + ^p(a)[Viw(r) - ViL(r) ] . (2.18)
a p'(a)
To assure that the solution to this problem is unique, we make the
following additional assumption on the relationship between g(a) and
P(a):
S'(a)
is a strictly convex function for all a e [O.q].
P'(a) (2.19)
It should be noted that g'(a)/p'(a) is increasing in a by our original
assumptions on p(a) and g(a) . Let a2(r) solve the problem in (2.18).
The current principal's expected reward in then
g'(a2(r))
U2(r) ^ p(a2(r))[X(r) + y3(Viw(r) - ViL(r))]. (2.20)
P'(a2(r))
The agent's sum of discounted rewards over the two periods can then be
written as:
g'(a2(r))
'^,
V2(r) - p(a2(r)) g(a2(r)) + ^^n^W . (2.21)
||) P'(a2(r))
Note that
16
U2(r) + V2(r) = p(a2(r))X(r) - g(a2(r)) (2.22)
+ ^[p(a2(r))Viy(r) + (l-p(a2 (r) )ViL(r) ]
.
If a fixed-payment contract is used in the first period, the
agent is not able to capture any rents from increased reputation in
the last period, since the agent receives the reservation wage (in
expectation) in the last period independent of the first period
outcome. The principal's expected reward is:
Uf(r) = P2(r) = MAX p(a)X(r) - g(a) (2.23)
Clearly, V2(r) > for all r. Can we find conditions such that the
principal in the first period is strictly better off with the
incentive contract; i.e., such that U2(r) > U2(r)?
In the next section we provide conditions for such an outcome.
We also give conditions under which the ex ante expected total
discounted surplus is strictly greater with incentive contracts than
with fixed-payment contracts.
17
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III. DOMINANCE OF INCENTIVE CONTRACTS
In this section we analyze the properties of the model developed
in the previous section and provide sufficient conditions for an
incentive contract to be superior to a fixed-payment contract for the
principal in the first period.
To show the existence of such conditions, we first provide some
comparative statics results. These results are used in the proof of
the sufficiency of the conditions we provide for the superiority of
incentive contracts. In addition, the comparative statics results
provide some intuition into the properties of the optimal linear
sharing rules between the principals and the agent.
The rewards for the agent and the principal in the final period
depend on the initial level of reputation r, and the state that
occurred in the first period. Define the agent's expected reward with
the incentive contract, the principal's expected reward with the
incentive contract, and the total expected surplus with the fixed-
payment contract for the states W (win) and L (lose) as:
Vi(ris(r)), Ui(ri3(r)), and uf(ris(r)) for s = W,L. (3.1)
Since r][y(r) and r]_L(r) have been defined as strictly increasing
functions of r, to show that the functions in (3.1) are increasing in
r we need only show that they are increasing in their direct
arguments, r]^.
All of our comparative statics results on the last period are
contained in the following proposition:
18
PROPOSITION 3.1
Under the assumptions of our model:
(i) ai(ri);
(ii) Ki(ri)X(ri);
(iii) (1 - Ki(ri))X(ri);
(iv) Ux(ri) ; and
(v) V]^(r]^) are all increasing functions of r]^ , and
(iv) Vi(ri) < p(ai(ri))X'(ri).
The proposition demonstrates that a higher level of current
reputation increases the agent's level of effort, the total reward to
both the agent and the principal in the win state, and the expected
reward to both the principal and the agent. In addition, any increase
in current reward as a result of increased reputation accrues to both
the agent and the the current principal since V]_(r]_) <p(a]^(r]_) )X' (r]_) .
Recall (from Section II) that we can write, for any initial level
of reputation r, the principal's expected rewards with an incentive
contract and with a fixed-payment contract respectively as:
g'(a)
U2(r) = MAX p(a)[ X(r) - + ^(Viy(r) - Vij^(r))], (3.2)
a p'(a)
and
Uf(r) = MAX p(a)X(r) - g(a)
.
(3.3)
For ease of exposition, we let A(r;W,L) = Vxy(r) - V]^l(^) » A(-)
19
represents the net effect of winning over losing in the first period
on the last period's rewards for the agent. From Proposition 3.1 and
the definition of V]_y(r) and V]^L(r) we have
A(r;W,L) > 0. (3.4)
In the following Theorem we give sufficient conditions under which the
first period principal is strictly better off with an incentive
contract than with a fixed- payment contract.
THEOREM 3.1
If (i) X(r) is unbounded from above; and
(ii) r]_s(r) = r]_(r,s) for s=W,L
where r]_(",') is strictly increasing and unbounded from above in both
of its arguments, then there exists a W(r) for every r such that for
all W > W(r), U2(r) > uJCr)
.
The interpretation of Theorem 3.1 is straightforward: if the
differential, effect next period between winning and losing in the
current period is "large enough", the first period principal is
strictly better off allowing the agent to capture some of the next
period's rents from increased reputation. This large incremental
benefit of winning over losing causes the agent to work harder
(provide more effort) in the current period, and therefore increases
the probability of winning in the current period; this extra effort
benefits the principal as well.
20
We now give some comparative statics results on rewards in the
first period:
PROPOSITION 3.2
Under the assumptions of the model,
(i) V2(r) is an increasing function of r;
When X'(r) + fi[^[^(r) - v[i^(ic)] > (<) 0,
(ii) U2(r) is increasing (decreasing) in r;
(iii) a2(r) is increasing (decreasing) in r; and
(iv) (1 - K2(^))^(^) is increasing (decreasing) in r.
(v) K2(r)X(r) is (increasing) in r.
The agent's discounted sum of expected rewards has been shown to
increase as initial reputation increases. Therefore, the agent is
strictly better off with a higher level of reputation at the start of
the planning horizon. Whether the principal in the first period is at
least as well off with an agent with a high level of initial
reputation as with an agent with a low level of initial reputation
depends, in equilibrium, on the rate of change of the principal's
expected utility, U2(r) = p(a2(r) ) (X' (r) + Hv[^M - v[i^(r)) .
Thus, the first period principal's expected reward is increasing
or decreasing in reputation as X' (r) + /3(V]^y(r) - Vii^(v)) is
increasing or decreasing in r. This expression represents the total
discounted rents from winning in the first period. The first term,
X' (r) , represents the change in the current periods total reward with
increased reputation; by assumption, this change is positive. The
21
Isecond term, ji3(V]_^(r) - V]^L(r)), represents the discounted future net
benefit of winning, to the agent, in the current period; i.e., the
future rents that result from winning rather than losing in the
current period. When this term is positive, the sum of the two terms
is positive, and we have U2(r) increasing in r. When the latter term
is negative, the change in U2(r) will depend on the relative magnitude
of the two terms. Only when then marginal benefit of increased
reputation is much larger if the agent loses in the current period
than if the agent wins, will U2(r) be a decreasing function of r.
However, in general we cannot sign (V]^y(r) - V]_L(r)). When /3 is
small, the X' (r) term dominates, and we know that U2 > since the
future is heavily discounted by the agent. Since j3 is bounded from
above by 1 , we cannot necessarily make /3 large enough so that X' (r) +
y^C^iyCr) - V]_L(r)) > when the term in brackets is negative. Also
when /3 is small, X(r) + ^{Vi-^{r) - V2^L(r)) gets closer to X(r) . As a
result, for sufficiently small /3, ufCr) will be strictly greater than
U2(r). In this case, the first period principal will be strictly
better off with a fixed price contract than with an incentive
contract.
Just as the sign of U2(r) depends upon the sign of X' (r) +
^(y'l^M - V^LCr)), so too do the signs of a2(r) , 3 (1-K2(r) )X(r)/ar
,
and aK2(r)X(r)/ar. Only when X' (r) + ^[V^yCr) - V^LCr) ] < is the
relationship between reputation and (i) effort, (i) the agent's share,
and (iii) the principal's share unambiguous. In this case the
marginal benefit of increased reputation (to the agent) is much larger
next period if the agent loses in the current period than if the agent
22
wins in the current period. Increasing reputation increases the
agent's effort and the principal's share and decreases the agent's
share. The agent is trading off probability of winning for reward.
In the following proposition we give sufficient conditions for
X' (r) + /3[V;lw(^) " ^Il(^)] ^ ^' ^^^ thus sufficient conditions for
U2(r), a2(r), and (1-K2(r) )X(r) to be non-decreasing in r.
PROPOSITION 3.3
Under the assumptions of the model, and
if X'(r) > riL(r)-X'(riL),
then X'(r) + )9[viy(r) - V^LCr)] > 0.
When X' (r) > r]_L(r) "X' {'^w) we have an impounding process and a
reward structure in which an increase in current reputation increases
current reward if the win state occurs this period more than it
increases reward in the future if the lose state occurs this period.
For example, if r]_L(r) = ^Lr + L, where ^^ < 1, we have a decay
process. Since X(r) is assumed to be a concave function of r, our
conditions are met.
The implication of this proposition is that the first period
principal, if given a choice between agents with different levels of
current reputation, should choose the agent with the highest level of
current reputation.
Suppose that the initial level of reputation is fixed at some
level r, but we allow W (or L) to vary so that (V]^y(r) - ViL(r)) =
A(r;W,L) is increasing; for ease of exposition in what follows, denote
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this difference by Aj- . This difference represents the net future
benefit of winning over losing in the current period. We can describe
what happens to the agent's and principal's current reward in the win
state as Aj- increases or decreases. This proposition can be used as
an explanation of pro bono work in potentially landmark cases : the
lawyer is willing to forego current payment because the net benefit of
winning over losing is so large that the lawyer is willing to take
payment in the "future". Another interpretation is that the client
needs to supply less current incentive to get the lawyer to work; the
lawyer is motivated by future rewards as well.
PROPOSITION 3.4
The agent's (principal's) share of current reward in the first period,
K2(r)X(r) ( (1 - K2(r))X(r) ) is a decreasing (increasing) function of
Ar-
To summarize, in this section we have demonstrated that in the
last period both the agent's and principal's expected rewards are
increasing functions of initial reputation, as are the agent's level
of effort and the share of current reward going to the principal. In
the first period, the agent's sum of discounted expected reward is
increasing in initial reputation; however, the first period
principal's expected reward is increasing in initial reputation only
if the total discounted rents from winning in the first period are
increasing in initial reputation. Finally, and most importantly, we
have demonstrated the existence of conditions under which a risk-
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neutral first period principal is strictly better off with an
incentive contract than with a fixed-payment contract, even though the
agent is also risk-neutral. These results come about because in
effect, an implicit intertemporal transfer is made between the last
and first period principals. -f I
I
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IIV. SURPLUS MAXIMIZING INCENTIVE CONTRACTS: AN EXAMPLE
In this section we provide an example in which the total ex ante
expected surplus is strictly greater with incentive contracts that
with fixed -payment contracts. We assume that p(a), g(a)
,
r]_g(r), and
X(r) have the following functional forms:
(i) p(a) = (1 - e"^) a > 0.
(ii) g(a) = a a > 0.
(iii) ris(r) = ^r + s s = W,L; ^ < 1 and W > L.
(iv) X(r) = ln(r + 1) + 1.
It is straightforward (though tedious) to verify that the
following hold:
(i) Vi(ris(r)) = yris(r) - 1 - InVris(r) and
A(r) - Vi(riy(r)) - Vi(riL(r));
(ii) Ui(ris(r)) = (yri3(r) -1)2;
(iii) Uj(ris(r)) = ri3(r) - 1 - Inris(r);
(iv) V2(r) = yr+M(r) - 1 - ln(Jr+/3Hr)) + ;9Vi(riL(r) ) ;
(v) U2(r) = (yr+M(r) - 1)^; and
(vi) U2(r) = r - 1 - Inr.
VThen fi = .9 and d = .9 , for example, there are several sets of
parameter values for r, W and L such that the total expected surplus
I
is larger with the incentive contracts than with the fixed- payment
contracts. In particular, if r = .2, L = 0, and W = 30, we get first
period reward of X(r) = 1.1832, and last period rewards of X(rx^) =
4.46687 and X(riL) - 1.16551. The ex ante total expected surplus with
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the fixed-payment contract is U^Cr) + ;3E[U]^(r]^s (^) ] =° .31950, where
expectation is taken with respect to the probabilities of winning and
losing in the first period with the fixed- payment contract. In
contrast, the ex ante total expected surplus with incentive contracts
is V2(r) + U2(r) + y3E[U]_(r]_s(r) ) ] = .32043, where the expectation is
taken with respect to the probabilities of winning and losing in the
first period with the incentive contracts. The superiority of
incentive contracts over fixed price contracts (for this example)
increases monotonically as W is increased.
The above result depends directly on the functional forms and
parameter values chosen. However, we have chosen reasonable
functional forms and parameter values that give us non-pathological
results (all effort levels are positive and all shares are positive)
.
Thus, we have demonstrated the existence of interesting situations in
which the total surplus can be made larger by allowing the agent's to
capture rents each period instead of forcing the agent's dcv-n to their
reservation wages.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
We have developed a model in which intertemporal interdependcies
and divergence of time preferences alter the form of optimal contracts
between a risk-neutral agent and risk-neutral principals. The agent
wishes to maximize the discounted sum of benefits over his or her
lifetime; the principals each want to maximize only current rewards.
Conditions exist under which all principals (except the final
period's principal) can be made strictly better off by allowing the
agent to capture some surplus each period, instead of forcing the
agent down to the reservation wage with a fixed-payment contract. The
incentive contracts serve as a means of aligning the time preferences
of the agent and the principals.
In addition, we have a non-pathological example in which the
total ex ante suplus generated by the incentive contracts is strictly
larger than that generated by the fixed-payment contracts. Our
results can be used as a partial explanation of why we don't see risk-
neutral agents buying output from risk-neutral principals, as well as
why there are implicit or explicit prohibitions against such contracts
in some professions (such as the legal profession)
.
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APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 2.1:
We wish to show that the following constrained maximization problems
are equivalent; that is, (K(r]_)
,
a(r]_) ) solves
MAX p(a)(l - K)X(ri)
K,a
s.t. p'(a)KX(ri) - g' (a) =
p(a)KX(ri) - g(a) >
iff (K(r]^) ,a(r]_) ) solves
MAX p(a)(l - K)X(r]_)
K,a
s.t p'(a)KX(ri) - g' (a) = 0.
We demonstrate this result by showing that the feasible sets for both
of these problems are the same. Let
F(ri) - {(K,a)|p'(a)KX(ri) ' g' (a) = 0. p(a)KX(ri) - g(a) > 0};
G(ri) s {(K.a)|p'(a)KX(ri) - g' (a) = 0).
Clearly, F(r]^) is contained in G(ri) . We must now show that G(r]^) is
A A, A A A
contained in FCr^) . Let (K,a) be such that p'(a)KX(ri) - g' (a) =
A A A
and assume that p(a)KX(rx) " g(^) < 0- Since g(a)/p(a) is non-
A A A A
decreasing in a, we know that g' (a)p(a) - p'(a)g(a) > 0. Solving for
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»K, we get
g'(a)
K =
p'(a)X(ri)
Substituting this into p(a)KX(r]^) - g(a) < 0, gives us
g'(a)
P(a) X(ri) - g(a) =
p'(a)X(ri)
A A A A
p(a)g' (a) - p' (a)g(a)
< 0.
P'(a)
Since p'(a) > 0, this contradicts our assumption that g(a)/p(a) is
non-decreasing in a. Therefore, p(a)KX(r]_) - g(a) > 0, and we have
G(r]_) is contained in FCr^^) . QED
Proof of Proposition 2.2:
We wish to demonstrate that the following constrained maximization
problems are equivalent: that is, that (K(r),a(r)) solves
MAX p(a)(l - K)X(r)
a
s.t. p'(a)[KX(r) + i9(Viy(r) - Vii^(r))] - g' (a) = 0;
p(a)KX(r) - g(a) + ^[p(a)Viw(r) + (l-p(a) )ViL(r) ] >
iff (K(r),a(r)) solves
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MAX p(a)(l - K)X(r)
a
s.t. p'(a)[KX(r) + fi(Vi^(r) - ViL(r))] - g' (a) =
We proceed exactly as the proof of Proposition 2.1. Let
F(r) - {(K,a)|p'(a)[KX(r) + /3(Viy(r) - ViL(r))] - g' (a) =
and p(a)KX(r) - g(a) + i3(p(a)Viy(r) + (l-p(a) )ViL(r) ) > 0)
and
G(r) - {(K,a)|p'(a)[KX(r) + ^(ViyCr) - ViL(r))] - g' (a) = 0.)
Clearly, F(r) is contained in G(r) . We again must demonstrate that
A A
G(r) is contained in F(r) . Let (K,a) e G(r) . Then
g'(a) i9(Viw(r) - ViL(r))
K = .
p'(a)X(r) X(r)
and
P(a) - ^p(a)[Viy(r) - ViL(r)] - g(a)
P'(a)
+ i3[p(a)Viy(r) + (l-p'(a)ViL(r)
.
g'(a)
P(a)—^ - g(a) + ;3ViL(r) > 0,
P'(a)
A A A A
since p(a)g'(a) - g(a)p'(a) > by assumption and ^n^ir) > from
Proposition 2.1. Therefore, G(r) is contained in F(r)
.
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Proof of Proposition 3.1:
Note that we do not proceed in order from (i) through (vi)
.
(i) By definition, a]_(r]_) is chosen to solve
g'(a)>MAX p(a)X(ri) - p(a)
a p'(a)
The first order conditions for this problem are then
g"(a)p'(a) - p"(a)g'(a)
p'(a)X(ri) - g'(a) -p(a)[ ] =0. (A.l)
(P'(a)}2
These conditions are necessary and sufficient by concavity of p(a)
,
convexity of g(a) and strict convexity of g'(a)/p'(a). Let the left
hand side of (A.l) be denoted by F]_(a,r]_) for ease of exposition.
Totally differentiating this function with respect to r]_ gives
aPi
^
aPx
a]_ + = 0.
3a dr\
From the second order conditions we have F]_ non- increasing in a. The
sign of a]_ is thus the same as the sign of
aPi
= p(ai(ri))X'(ri) > 0.
3ri
Therefore, we have our desired result that a]_ is increasing in r]_.
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(ii) To show that K]_(r]_)X(r]_) is increasing in r^^, we note that
g'(ai(ri))
Ki(ri)X(ri) =
P'(ai(ri))
Therefore
aKi(ri)X(ri) (g"p' - p"g')
^
= ax >
(iv) By definition
g'(ai(ri))
Ui(ri) = p(ai(ri))X(ri) - p(ai(ri))
P'(ai(ri))
Therefore
,g' (S"P' - P"g')
,
Ui(ri) = p'aiX + pX' - p'ai p ai
p' Ip')^
(g"P' - P"g')
,
= [P'X - g' - p ]ai + pX'
= pX'
in equilibrium. Since X' > 0, we have our desired result,
(v) By definition
g'(ai(ri))
Vi(ri) = p(ai(ri)) g(ai(ri)).
P'(ai(ri))
Therefore
,
,g' g"P' - P"g'
,
Vi(rx) = p'ai— + p{ —-—- }ai - g'ai
P' (P')2
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g"p' - p"g'
= p{ — r ) ' ^ ^^-2)}ai > 0,
from part (i) above.
(vi) From (A. 2) we have
g"P' - P"g'
Vl(ri) =p{ Ij '
(p')2 1 (A. 3)
Totally differentiating (A.l) with
ai =
respect to r^ gives us
p'X'
P"^ - g"
- {g"P'-p"g') - p a2 g' ^^-"^
P' da^ p;
Substituting (A. 4) into (A. 3) gives
Vi(ri) =
P{g'^P' - p-g'}p-X '
P' aa2 p'
From (A.l) we have that in equilibria
-um,
P g'
^ " ;
—
7{g"p'-p"g'} + -
(p')2 p'
so that
p"X g'
P"P g.
-
^^,^3(g"p'-p"g'} ^p^^^
P' 'P 1
= {g"p'-p"g'}f 1o f F 6 M - ]
(P')-^ p'
g'.
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Therefore, the denominator in (A. 5) can be written as
P"P
g"p'-p"g')[ : -] + {g"p'-p"g')[—
(p')-^ p' p'
(2(p')2 - p"p) a2 g'
g"p'-p"g') + p— ~ >
(p')-^ aa2 p'
(2(p')2 - p"p)
(g"P'-p"g') ;
(P')^
since g'/p' is assumed strictly convex in a. Substituting (A. 6) into
(A. 5) gives us
p{g"p'-p"g}X'
Vi(ri) <
(A. 6) I
{g"p'-p"g'}(2(p')2-p"p)
(P')2
P(P')^
2(p')2-p"p
X' <
pX',
since p'>0, p''<0 and p<l implies that (p' )^/(2(p' )2-p'
'
p) < 1; we
thus have our desired result.
(iii) To demonstrate (1 - K]_(r]_) )X(r]^) is increasing in r]_ we use
(A. 4) to solve for X' in terms of a]_, and
3(1 - Ki(ri))X(ri) {g"p' - p"g')
= X'(ri) ai
3ri (p')2
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-P" g" a g' d^ g' 5 g' ,
= ( X + + [ ] + p[—- -] - [ ]}ai
p' p' da p' da^ p' da p'
-P" g" ^2 g'
= { X + + [ ] )ai >
p' p' aa^ p'
by assumptions of p, g, and g'/P' . ^^^ ^^^ result that a]_ > .
QED
Proof of Theorem 3.1:
(i) We first prove that A(r;W,L) is strictly increasing and unbounded
from above in W. From Proposition 3.1, V2^(r]_) is strictly increasing
in r^. Since V^^yCr) = V]_(r]_y(r)) and r]^y(r) = rx(r]^,W) is assumed
strictly increasing in W, we have V]_y( • ) strictly increasing in W.
Since V]_L(r) is independent of W, we have A(r;W,L) strictly increasing
in W, A(r;W,L) unbounded from above is immediate from X(r) unbounded
from above, so that V]_(r) is unbounded from above, and r]_(-,-)
unbounded from above.
(ii) We define the following function for ease of exposition:
g'(a)
M(r,A) = MAX p(a)[ X(r) ~ + A ]. (A. 7)
P'(a)
Note that the right hand side of (A. 7) is just (3.2) with
^(^IW(^) - VxL(r)) replaced by A. Let
U2(r) g'(a)
A(r) s MIN { + - X(r) ). (A. 8)
a p(a) p'(a)
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To demonstrate that the MIN is obtained in (A. 8), we note that l/p(a)
is decreasing and convex in a, and that g'(a)/p'(a) is increasing and
strictly convex in a. Thus, the MIN will be obtained at some a(r)
.
Then
g'(a(r))
p(a(r))[X(r) +A(r)] =U2(r).
P'(a(r))
By definition,
g'(a(r))
M(r,A(r)) > p(a(r))[X(r) + A(r) = U2(r).
P'(a(r))
Also from the definition of M(r,A) we have
M(r,A) > M(r.A(r)) for all A > A(r)
.
Clearly, A(r) > for all r. We now must show that we can find a
W(r) , for fixed L, such that
/3(Vi(ri(r,w)) - Vi(ri(r,l))) > A(r) . (A. 9)
It is sufficient for (A. 9) that
(i) at W = L, ;9(Vi(ri(r,W)) - Vi(ri(r,L))) = 0, and
(ii) V]^(r]_(r ,W) ) - V]_(r]_(r ,L) ) is an increasing, unbounded
function of W.
Let
W(r) - MIN( W| ^(Vi(ri(r,W)) - Vi(ri(r,L))) > A(r)}.
Then, for all W > W(r)
,
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g'(a)
MAX p(a)[X(r) - + ^(Vi(ri(r ,W) ) - V]_(ri(r,L))) >
a p'(a)
MAX p(a)X(r) - g(a)
,
a
which is our desired result.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3.2:
(i) It is straightforward to verify that in equilibrium,
g'(a2(r))
V2(r) = p(a2(r)) g(a2(r)) + /3Vi(riL(r))
P'(a2(r))
and (A. 10)
g' 'p' - p' 'g'
V2(r) = p{ }a2 + ^V^l.
(P')2
We thus need an explicit expression for a2 in order to sign V2 . We
note that the principal chooses a2(r) to solve
p'(a)[X(r) + ;9(Viw(r) - ViL(r))] - g' (a)
(A. 11)
g"(a)p'(a) - p"(a)g'(a)
- P(a)[ ] = 0.
(P'(a))2
Denoting the left hand side of (A. 10) by F2(a,r), we can totally
differentiate the left hand side of (A. 10) with respect to r and
rearrange terms to get:
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p'[X'(r) + ^(Viw - Vil)]
a2(r) = (A. 12)
-aF2/aa
where V^^ = V]_(rii)
•
rxi(r) for i=W,L. Substituting (A. 12) into (A. 10)
gives us
p p'(X' + ^(Viy - vIl))
V2(r)
-Jg"v' - P"g') — + ^ViL
(P')2 -F21
1 P
[—{g"p' - p"g'}{X' + )8(Viy
-Vil)} - /3VilF2i]
> I
-F21 p'
We must thus sign the term in the square brackets. From (A. 11) we
have
{g"P' - P"g') 32 g'
F21 = p"[x + /3(Viy - Vil)] - s" -^ - p— — • (A-13)
p' aa^ p'
Solving for X + /3(V][y - VuJ from (A. 11) gives us
g' P
X + /3(Viw - Vil) ^ + : (g"P' - P"g'). (A. 14)
p' (P')-^
Using (A, 13) in (A. 14) results in
g' P {g"p' - P"g')
F2I = P"[ - + : lg"P' -P"g'}] - g"
P' (P')^ P'
P"g' - g"p'} p'p" {g"p' - p"g')
+ r {g"p' - P"g'}
P' (P')^
P'P"- 2(p')2 a2 g,
g"p' - P"g') - P —: -• (A. 15)
(P')^ aa2 p'
Substituting the right hand side of (A. 15) into the term in square
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brackets in (A. 13) and collecting terms results in
P
sgn V2(r) = sgn { (g"p' - p"g')(X' + /3Vi^)
P'
P PP" - 2(p')2
- ^viL(g"p' - P"g')( +
P' (P')^
,
a2 g'
+ ^ViL — -)
da^ p'
Since V]_j_ > for i=W,L and and g'/p' is strictly convex, a sufficient
condition for V2 > is therefore
P PP" - 2(p')2
+ < 0.
P' (P')^
which follows immediately from assumptions on p.
(ii) This result is immediate from the fact that in equilibrium,
U2(r) = p'(a2(r)){X'(r) + I3{v[^(r) - v{L(r)))
(iii) From (A. 12) we have
p'[X'(r) + ^(Vlw - vIl)]
a2(r)
-aF2/aa
Since -5F2/3a = F2X > by the assumptions on p(-), g( ' ) and
g'(')/p'(*). and V]^y > V]^L fi^oni Proposition 3.1, we have the sign of
a2 the same as the sign of X' + ;3(V]^y - V]_l) .
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(iv) Using the individual rationality constraint to solve for
K2(r)X(r); and (A. 12) to solve for X + /SAi^^^^ = Al^^^^=^ uu reOno pd
3[g'/p']/53. in equilibrium, we have
5(1 - K2(r))X(r) d g'
= X' - - [-]a2 - /3(ViL - Viw)
3r2 da p'
-P" g" P 32 g'
= { (X + /9(Viw-Vil)) + — + r[— 1)^2
p' p' p' da^ p'
Since the term in curly brackets is strictly positive, the derivative
of (1 - K2(r))X(r) with respect to r has the same sign as a2 , which in
turn has the same sign as (X' + ^(VyvJ ' ^1l) ) > which is our desired
result.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3.3:
This result is immediate from
(i) V{(ri) < p(ai(ri))X'(ri) < X' (ri) for all ri
,
(ii) V^LCr) = Vi(riL(r))-ri_L(r)-> 0, and
(iii) ^ < 1.
QED
Proof of Proposition 3.4:
(Note that primes now denote derivatives with respect to Aj-) . Totally
differentiating the principal's first order condition with respect to
Aj- gives us:
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F2i-a2 + ^p' (a2) = 0. (A. 16)
Since X(r) does not depend on A;^. , we know that 5(1 - K2(r) )X(r)/3Aj- =
-aK2(r)X(r)/5A;t-. In equllbrium,
5K2(r)X(r) d g'
= - [-]a2 - ^ (A. 17)
3Aj- da p'
Using (A. 16) to solve for a2 and substituting gives:
aK2(r)X(r)
-fi d^ g'
= {p"(X + A^) - g" - p--[~]) < 0.
dAj. F21 aa^ p'
Thus, we have our desired result that the agent's share, K2(r)X(r), is
decreasing in Aj- and the principal's share, (1 - K2(r))X(r), is
increasing in Aj-.
QED
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FOOTNOTES
1. In a recent paper Laffont and Tirole [1988] allow the principal only
to offer short term (one-period) contracts to an agent in a two-period
model. However, the agent's ability is unknown to the principal and
the principal's objective is the maximization of welfare over the two
periods
.
2. That is, the effect of effort and reputation are "separable".
Effort effects the probability of winning but not the reward size.
Reputation, on the other hand, effects the reward size, but not the
probability of winning.
3. Note that we have implicitly excluded linear sharing rules that
give the agent KX - k if the agent wins and -k if the agent loses.
With this kind of sharing rule, the principal can force the agent down
to the reservation wage each period by the appropriate choice of k;
this kind of contract would provide the same reputational incentives
as selling X to the agent, and the principal would be strictly worse
off.
4. The assumptions on p(a) and g(a) assure that the "first order
approach" is valid, since the first order conditions are both
necessary and sufficient. Thus, the first order conditions define a
unique level of effort a.
5. Problem (2.9) is obtained by solving the incentive compatibility
constraint for K and substituting into the objective function in (2.7).
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